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Correlates of Organizational Rewards in the United Nations: an Analysis of Environmental and Legislative Variables

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  • Volgy, Thomas J.
  • Quistgard, Jon E.

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to examine the conditions for successful United Nations elective officeholding through an interregional comparison of three types of variables. Previous studies have primarily emphasized two types of determinants. Some have suggested that behavior in the United Nations is controlled by the environment of international politics, while others have attempted to link a nation state's level of socioeconomic development to elective officeholding success. This research suggests that the legislative variable may be the most useful predictor of elective officeholding. The legislative dimension is based upon the premise that the political processes in the Organization represent a quasi-legislative system. An examination of the three types of variables led to the conclusion that legislative behavior is the most consistent predictor of elective officeholding success across regions. This finding does not negate the salience of environmental interactions or nation state attributes, but it does suggest that nation state participation in the political processes of the Organization appears to be the best predictor of officeholding success.

Suggested Citation

  • Volgy, Thomas J. & Quistgard, Jon E., 1974. "Correlates of Organizational Rewards in the United Nations: an Analysis of Environmental and Legislative Variables," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 179-205, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:28:y:1974:i:02:p:179-205_00
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