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Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation

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  • Olson, Mancur

Abstract

I am happy to respond to the invitation to comment on Bruce Russett's and John Sullivan's most useful and sensible article. The concept of collective goods must play a starring role in any adequate theory of international organization and cooperation so there is every reason to encourage work of this kind. Russett's and Sullivan's article is, moreover, worthy of extension and criticism on many specific points. On some of these points I have minor technical (or in some cases expositional) criticisms. But relevant as such technical issues can be, they attract only a specialized interest and are of far less practical importance than Russett's and Sullivan's central concern with the conditions under which more international collective goods can be obtained. They ask, in effect, how patterns of international organization and cooperation that could help to improve the inefficient, and at times even chaotic and violent, international system could in practice be attained.

Suggested Citation

  • Olson, Mancur, 1971. "Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 866-874, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:25:y:1971:i:04:p:866-874_01
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    2. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    3. Michael D. Intriligator, 1982. "Research on Conflict Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 307-327, June.
    4. Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, 2010. "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 616-637, August.
    5. Smith, Brad W. & Novak, Kenneth J. & Frank, James & Travis, Lawrence F., 2000. "Multijurisdictional drug task forces: An analysis of impacts," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 543-556.
    6. Wallace J. Thies, 1987. "Alliances and Collective Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 298-332, June.
    7. Kunz, Nathan & Chesney, Thomas & Trautrims, Alexander & Gold, Stefan, 2023. "Adoption and transferability of joint interventions to fight modern slavery in food supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 258(C).
    8. Nozomu Matsubara, 1989. "Conflict and Limits of Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(1), pages 113-141, March.
    9. Joe Oppenheimer, 1979. "A Reassessment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(3), pages 387-407, September.
    10. Charlotte Unger & Kathleen A. Mar & Konrad Gürtler, 2020. "A club’s contribution to global climate governance: the case of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(1), pages 1-10, December.
    11. John R. Oneal, 1990. "Testing the Theory of Collective Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 426-448, September.

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