The Genesis of the Veto

Finding a satisfactory voting formula for an international organization of “sovereign” states, such as the Security Council of the United Nations, is a different task from establishing rules of voting for a national legislative body. In an international body both the character of the work to be done and the composition of the body are governing factors. If the body has to make decisions involving the use of force, full respect for sovereignty by requiring unanimity permits the exercise of a liberum veto that blocks action. Simple rules of “democratic” usage by which the members are assumed to be equal in strength, though in fact they are not, cannot be applied, for this might pit weak numerical majorities against preponderantly powerful minorities. On the other hand, frankly to acknowledge the overweening might of a few and to establish a “dictatorship” by giving the most powerful members exclusive voting privileges is politically unacceptable and probably impracticable in our times. Therefore, some compromise has to be found, with reference to the duties and responsibilities of the organization and its composition, that will strike a workable balance between the inequalities of the members and a decent respect for the views and interests of the less powerful.