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The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund: A Decision-Making Instrument

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  • Hexner, Ervin P.

Abstract

In the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the steadily growing feeling generated by the frustrating confusion of the interwar period that the world needed some kind of orderly institutionalization of international payments relations at last found a formal expression. As early as 1930 John Maynard Keynes suggested “the management of the value of gold by a Supernational Authority, with a number of national monetary systems clustering round it.…” Keynes was fully aware of the political implications of this suggestion. He realized the significance for international cooperation of “a cabinet of Central Banks who would hold the sovereign power.” The timid attempts toward establishing in the monetary sphere effective international collaboration in the interwar period were frustrated by political considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Hexner, Ervin P., 1964. "The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund: A Decision-Making Instrument," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 74-96, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:18:y:1964:i:01:p:74-96_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Karen Taylor & Craig Tipping & Adam McKissack, 2004. "IMF Quotas, Representation and Governance," Treasury Working Papers 2004-03, The Treasury, Australian Government, revised Nov 2004.
    2. Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, 2009. "Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 383-406, December.
    3. Ryan Federo & Angel Saz‐Carranza, 2020. "A typology of board design for highly effective monitoring in intergovernmental organizations under the United Nations system," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 344-361, April.

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