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A differential game of international pollution control with evolving environmental costs

Author

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  • Masoudi, Nahid
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

We consider a two-player differential game of international emissions to represent the interactions between two groups of countries, namely, developed and developing countries. We adopt a broader-than-usual definition of environmental cost for developing countries to account for their evolving involvement in tackling environmental externalities. Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are characterized and contrasted. We find that it may not be the best course of action to push developing countries to reduce their emissions in the short term, and that cooperation may not create enough dividend, also in the short term, to be implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Masoudi, Nahid & Zaccour, Georges, 2013. "A differential game of international pollution control with evolving environmental costs," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 680-700, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:18:y:2013:i:06:p:680-700_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simone Marsiglio & Nahid Masoudi, 2019. "Transboundary Pollution Control and Competitiveness Concerns in a Two-Country Differential Game," CFDS Discussion Paper Series 2019/1, Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China.
    2. Kakeu, Johnson & Agbo, Maxime, 2022. "International transfer to reduce global inequality and transboundary pollution," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    3. Dai, Rui & Zhang, Jianxiong, 2017. "Green process innovation and differentiated pricing strategies with environmental concerns of South-North markets," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 132-150.
    4. Baogui Xin & Wei Peng & Minghe Sun, 2019. "Optimal Coordination Strategy for International Production Planning and Pollution Abating under Cap-and-Trade Regulations," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-21, September.
    5. Simone Marsiglio & Nahid Masoudi, 2022. "Reclamation of a resource extraction site: A differential game approach," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 770-802, July.
    6. Rui Dai & Jianxiong Zhang & Guowei Liu, 2020. "Carbon Tariff vs. Emission Cap of North–South Countries in Response to Manufacturer’s Production," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-20, February.
    7. Sher Jahan Khan & Puneet Kaur & Fauzia Jabeen & Amandeep Dhir, 2021. "Green process innovation: Where we are and where we are going," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(7), pages 3273-3296, November.
    8. Dmitry Gromov & Ekaterina Gromova, 2017. "On a Class of Hybrid Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 266-288, June.
    9. Andrés-Domenech, Pablo & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Zaccour, Georges, 2015. "Cooperation for sustainable forest management: An empirical differential game approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 118-128.
    10. Lina Mallozzi & Stefano Patri & Armando Sacco, 2015. "Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 135-154, December.
    11. Biancardi, Marta & Villani, Giovanni, 2015. "The effects of R&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-39.

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