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Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

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  • CARRARO, CARLO
  • MARCHIORI, CARMEN
  • SGOBBI, ALESSANDRA

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water management problems. The interest in this subject stems from two considerations: (i) water resources continue to be mismanaged, despite their recognized importance for sustainable development, in particular in developing countries; (ii) negotiated decision making has the potential to improve water management, yet there is still little formal understanding of the forces driving bargaining processes, and applications of formal negotiation theory to water issues are also lacking. This paper surveys the existing non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water management problems, with the purpose of preliminarily assessing whether such a formal approach in the phase of problem exploration and policy formulation can support decision makers in the real world. It is the contention of this paper that the proposed approach may offer direct and indirect support by: shortening the time needed to reach an agreement through the (theoretical) identification of an ‘acceptability space’, and helping select policies which are self-enforcing and, therefore, acceptable.

Suggested Citation

  • Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 329-349, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:12:y:2007:i:02:p:329-349_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 187-210, February.
    2. Cobourn, Kelly M. & Amacher, Gregory S. & Elbakidze, Levan, 2015. "Bargaining for recharge: an analysis of cooperating and conjunctive surface water-groundwater management," 2016 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2016, San Francisco, California 212843, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2016. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/266574, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2011. "A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 119-150, April.
    5. Marianna Khachaturyan & Karina Schoengold, 2019. "Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura–Araks Basin," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-32, January.
    6. Petr Fiala & Petr Šauer, 2011. "Aplikace kombinatorických aukcí na alokaci veřejných podpor v oblasti životního prostředí: ekonomický laboratorní experiment [Application of Combinatorial Auctions on Allocation of Public Financial," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(3), pages 379-392.
    7. Tyagi, Ashish & Shortle, James S., 2016. "Modeling Endogenous Change in Water Allocation Mechanisms: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Approach," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235571, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    8. Rémy Delille & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2014. "The Seawall Bargaining Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-13, June.
    9. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
    10. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Hurt, Wesley & Osório, António (António Miguel), 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/237596, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    12. Álvarez, Xana & Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2019. "Risk prevention of land flood: A cooperative game theory approach," MPRA Paper 91515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Moradi, Sohrab & Limaei, Soleiman Mohammadi, 2018. "Multi-objective game theory model and fuzzy programing approach for sustainable watershed management," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 363-371.
    14. Carmen Marchiori, 2010. "Concern for Fairness and Incentives in Water Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 553-571, April.
    15. Kristal K. Trejo & Ruben Juarez & Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2023. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining with Unsophisticated Agents," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 937-974, March.
    16. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Osorio, Antonio, 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," MPRA Paper 56690, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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