IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/ecnphi/v32y2016i02p231-248_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ellsberg’S Paradox And The Value Of Chances

Author

Listed:
  • Bradley, Richard

Abstract

What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a non-linear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox. While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian decision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible with it.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley, Richard, 2016. "Ellsberg’S Paradox And The Value Of Chances," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 231-248, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:32:y:2016:i:02:p:231-248_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0266267115000358/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alex Voorhoeve & Ken Binmore & Arnaldur Stefansson & Lisa Stewart, 2016. "Ambiguity attitudes, framing, and consistency," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 313-337, September.
    2. Marc Fleurbaey, 2018. "Welfare economics, risk and uncertainty," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 5-40, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:32:y:2016:i:02:p:231-248_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/eap .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.