Law, Judicial Review, and Formal Models of the Regulation Game: A Comment on de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo

In “The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation,” (hereafter referred to as LLAR), John and Rui de Figueiredo make an important contribution to our understanding of how interest groups choose between lobbying and litigation strategies in the regulation game. Their work demonstrates the value of formally modeling the regulation game by distinguishing between lobbying and litigation. Drawing upon my own related work, in this brief comment I will focus upon some of the implications of formal models of lobbying and litigation for our understanding of how regulatory incentives are affected by judicial review and alternative statutory regimes. I hope to atleast suggest that in addition to illuminating many crucial issues in political science—such as the theory of lobbying and theories of political disadvantage—the sort of approach taken by the de Figueiredos has great significance for the analysis of some fundamental issues in administrative law and public law more generally.