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The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the ‘Level Playing Field’ in Cable TV Franchising Statutes

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  • Hazlett, Thomas W.
  • Ford, George S.

Abstract

Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the ‘public interest’ in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent's franchise. While billed as ‘level playing field’ laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech's cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazlett, Thomas W. & Ford, George S., 2001. "The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the ‘Level Playing Field’ in Cable TV Franchising Statutes," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 21-46, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:3:y:2001:i:01:p:21-46_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Johns Adam, 2012. "Contested Contestability: Competition Policy and the Development of Communications Satellite Broadcasting in Japan," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-21, August.
    2. James E. Prieger, 2005. "Endogenous Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation," Working Papers 54, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. James E. Prieger, 2005. "Endogenous Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. James Prieger, 2008. "Product innovation, signaling, and endogenous regulatory delay," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 95-118, October.
    5. Prieger, James E., 2007. "Regulatory delay and the timing of product innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 219-236, April.

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