IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/buhirw/v66y1992i03p523-572_06.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920–1980

Author

Listed:
  • Kaufman, Allen
  • Zacharias, Lawrence

Abstract

Although the managerial function arises out of organizational needs imposed by market competition and technological development, managers' professional status has come in large part from legal conceptions that perceive the managerially run firm as an institutional bulwark for modern democracy. This article examines how the law, through its doctrines of trust and contract, has made and unmade management as a semi-public profession. The article explores the history of tender-offer regulation as a case study of this process.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaufman, Allen & Zacharias, Lawrence, 1992. "From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920–1980," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 523-572, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:buhirw:v:66:y:1992:i:03:p:523-572_06
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007680500069221/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "From individual responsibility to ÔsharedÕ social responsibilities: concepts for a new paradigm," Econometica Working Papers wp27, Econometica.
    2. Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, 2011. "Behavioral Economics, Federalism, and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 421-438, September.
    3. Pierre-Yves Gomez, 2003. "Jalons pour une histoire des théories du gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(4), pages 183-208, December.
    4. Styhre Alexander, 2018. "The Making of the Shareholder Primacy Governance Model: Price Theory, the Law and Economics School, and Corporate Law Retrenchment Advocacy," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 1-31, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:buhirw:v:66:y:1992:i:03:p:523-572_06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/bhr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.