Absence: Electoral Cycles and Teacher Absenteeism in India

Public sector worker absence has been cited as a reason for the poor performance of public services. This paper argues that the differential attention politicians pay to public services over their tenure cycle can explain levels of absenteeism. Using the case of teachers in India, teachers and politicians are embedded in a dynamic principal-agent relationship that allows for absenteeism when electoral incentives are not salient and results in increased accountability when they are. I constructed a panel of all schools across India between 2006 and 2018, employed an event study design, and found that teacher absenteeism decreases the year before an election and is higher the year after an election. I found inconsistent effects in the private sector, lending support for a channel of political control in the public sector. Political interference has an effect on bureaucratic performance, and relationships between public sector workers and politicians can ameliorate absenteeism.