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Do Political Elites Have Accurate Perceptions of Social Conditions?

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  • Thal, Adam

Abstract

Politicians often oppose economic policies benefiting low-income Americans. However, the mechanisms behind this political inequality are unclear. I ask whether politicians oppose these policies, in part, because they underestimate how many of those they govern are struggling financially. I test this theory with an original survey of 1,265 state legislative candidates. Contrary to my expectations, I find that politicians tend to overestimate how many of those they govern are struggling financially. At the same time, there are some instances in which politicians—and Republicans in particular—do underestimate the level of financial hardship among those they govern. In an experiment, I randomly assign politicians to have their misperceptions corrected. The results suggest that politicians' policy preferences would be similar even if they had a more accurate understanding of reality. Overall, the findings suggest that politicians may frequently misperceive the state of reality in which those they govern live.

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  • Thal, Adam, 2023. "Do Political Elites Have Accurate Perceptions of Social Conditions?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 1189-1207, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:53:y:2023:i:4:p:1189-1207_6
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    Cited by:

    1. Berliner, Daniel, 2023. "Information Processing in Participatory Governance," SocArXiv snerh, Center for Open Science.

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