Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Patrick Balles & Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2024. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2290-2320.
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2018.
"Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention,"
Economics Working Paper Series
1813, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2024. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," Working papers 2024/03, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2020. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," Working papers 2020/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2018. "Special Interest Groups versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," IZA Discussion Papers 11945, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2023.
"Television market size and political accountability in the U.S. House of Representatives,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
- Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2022. "Television Market Size and Political Accountability in the US House of Representatives," IZA Discussion Papers 15277, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 2023. "Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 75-99, January.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:44:y:2014:i:04:p:741-772_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jps .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.