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The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests

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  • MOON, WOOJIN

Abstract

In this article, the reason why incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending is explained. The argument is that incumbent spending efficiency depends on the marginality of seats: safe incumbent spending is less effective than marginal incumbent spending, since safe incumbents have to buy fewer extreme voters, whereas marginal incumbents can easily buy a larger number of swing voters. The analysis of the US Senate elections between 1974 and 2000 shows that safe incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending, but marginal incumbent spending is not. The analysis also shows that the previous finding of less effective incumbent spending is largely due to the fact that the data for marginal and safe incumbents have been aggregated.

Suggested Citation

  • Moon, Woojin, 2006. "The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 705-721, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:36:y:2006:i:04:p:705-721_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth Benoit & Michael Marsh, 2008. "The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 874-890, October.
    2. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    3. Bruno Carvalho, 2021. "Campaign Spending in Local Elections: the Effects of Public Funding," Working Papers ECARES 2021-30, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Bharatee Bhusana, Ferris, J Stephen Dash & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "Measuring Electoral Competitiveness: With Application to the Indian States," CESifo Working Paper Series 7216, CESifo.
    5. I Gede Sthitaprajna Virananda & Teguh Dartanto & Bintang Dara Wijaya, 2021. "Does Money Matter for Electability? Lesson Learned From the 2014 Legislative Election in Indonesia," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(4), pages 21582440211, October.
    6. Ron Johnston & Charles Pattie, 2009. "MPs' Expenditure and General Election Campaigns: Do Incumbents Benefit from Contacting their Constituents?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 57(3), pages 580-591, October.
    7. John Maloney & Andrew C. Pickering, 2013. "Party Activists, Campaign Funding, and the Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 210-238, February.

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