The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies
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- Han Dorussen & Jongryn Mo, 2001. "Ending Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(4), pages 395-426, August.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011.
"Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?," Working Papers 2009/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Marco Battaglini, 2021.
"Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(11), pages 3206-3258.
- Marco Battaglini, 2019. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," EIEF Working Papers Series 1902, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Mar 2019.
- Marco Battaglini, 2019. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 25664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2019. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 13581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tom Blockmans & Marie-Anne Guerry, 2016. "Coalition Formation Procedures: The Impact of Issue Saliences and Consensus Estimation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 481-499, May.
- Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel, 2018. "“Do government formation deadlocks damage economic growth? Evidence from history’s longest period of political deadlock”," IREA Working Papers 201817, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jul 2018.
- Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay, 2016. "Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 33-52, June.
- Fabrizio Carmignani, 2001. "Political Data for Applied Political Economy Research," Working Papers 43, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2001.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Tom Blockmans & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels & Bram Mahieu, 2016. "Bargaining complexity and the duration of government formation: evidence from Flemish municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 131-143, April.
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