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An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?

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  • Felsenthal, Dan S.
  • Maoz, Zeev
  • Rapoport, Amnon

Abstract

Six single- or multi-winner voting procedures are compared to one another in terms of the outcomes of thirty-seven real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations and non-profit-making organizations. The six procedures examined are two versions of plurality voting (PV), approval voting (AV), the Borda-count (BR), the alternative and repeated alternative vote (ALV–RAL) and the single transferable vote (STV). These procedures are evaluated in terms of two general and five specific criteria that are common in social-choice theory. In terms of these criteria one version of the PV procedure (PVO) is found to be inferior to the other five procedures among which no significant difference has been found.

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  • Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeev & Rapoport, Amnon, 1993. "An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:23:y:1993:i:01:p:1-27_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Kurz, Sascha & Mayer, Alexander & Napel, Stefan, 2020. "Weighted committee games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 972-979.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Voting for compromises: alternative voting methods in polarized societies," ECON - Working Papers 394, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Regenwetter, Michel, 2008. "Perspectives on preference aggregation," Papers 08-26, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    4. Brian Kogelmann, 2017. "Aggregating out of indeterminacy," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 16(2), pages 210-232, May.

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