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Political Confederation

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  • Crémer, Jacques
  • Palfrey, Thomas R.

Abstract

This article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation. The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation. We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states.

Suggested Citation

  • Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Political Confederation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 69-83, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:01:p:69-83_21
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2091-2106, November.
    2. Jon X. Eguia, 2006. "United We Vote," Working Papers 2006.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "The Assignment of Powers in Federal and Unitary States," Economic Research Papers 269340, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    4. Pierre Garaudel, 2020. "Exploring meta-organizations’ diversity and agency: A meta-organizational perspective on global union federations," Post-Print halshs-02474817, HAL.
    5. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
    6. Basu, Shubhabrata & Pereira, Vijay & Sinha, Paresha & Malik, Ashish & Moovendhan, V., 2022. "Esoteric governance mechanism and collective brand equity creation in confederated organizations: Evidence from an emerging economy," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 217-230.
    7. Ross Hickey, 2013. "Bicameral bargaining and federation formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 217-241, March.
    8. Mark Gradstein, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series 315, CESifo.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2020. "The political agenda effect and state centralization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 749-778.
    10. Garaudel, Pierre, 2020. "Exploring meta-organizations’ diversity and agency: A meta-organizational perspective on global union federations," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1).
    11. John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2008. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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