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Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections

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  • Atkeson, Lonna Rae
  • Partin, Randall W.

Abstract

We compare vote choice in senate and gubernatorial elections from 1986 and 1990 with two retrospective voting hypotheses: the national referendum hypothesis and an economic retrospective hypothesis. Despite the similarities between the office of U.S. senator and governor (same constituency, high levels of campaign spending, highly visible candidates, etc.), we find that different types of retrospective evaluations are used with respect to vote choice. As members of the national legislative branch, senators' fortunes are linked to the success or failures of the president. In contrast, governors, as state executives, are held accountable for perceived state economic conditions, while senators escape unscathed from the same general economic evaluations. These findings shed some light on the nature of vote choice in a political system complicated by federalism and separation of powers.

Suggested Citation

  • Atkeson, Lonna Rae & Partin, Randall W., 1995. "Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 99-107, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:01:p:99-107_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Rostislav Turovsky & Elizabeth Luizidis, 2021. "Autonomy Of Subnational Party Systems: Comparative Analysis Of Federations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 77/PS/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    3. Jeffrey Swanson & Namhoon Ki, 2020. "When Would a Democratic Governor Increase Social Welfare Funding? The Joint Moderation of a State's Economy and a Governor's Budgetary Authority," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(5), pages 634-656, September.
    4. Iyengar, Shanto & Lowenstein, Daniel H. & Masket, Seth, 1999. "The Stealth Campaign: Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in California," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt2s5116zk, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    5. Raphael Franck & Samia Tavares, 2008. "Income and vote switching between local and national elections: evidence from New York State," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(10), pages 1-10.
    6. Rodrigo Martins & Francisco Veiga, 2013. "Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 317-334, June.
    7. Charles D. Taylor, 2012. "Governors as Economic Problem Solvers," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 26(3), pages 267-276, August.
    8. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1997. "The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986-1992," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 81-99, February.
    9. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2013. "Running for office again: evidence from Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 677-702, September.
    10. Luigi M. Solivetti, 2020. "Political partisanship versus turnout in Italy’s 2016 referendum," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 709-734, June.
    11. Jens, Candace E., 2017. "Political uncertainty and investment: Causal evidence from U.S. gubernatorial elections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 563-579.
    12. Nicholas Clark, 2015. "The Federalist Perspective in Elections to the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 524-541, May.
    13. Sunghoon Joo & Dong H. Kim & Jung Chul Park, 2020. "Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 247-276, May.
    14. Aycan Katitas & Sonal Pandya, 2024. "Investment incentives attract foreign direct investment: evidence from the great recession," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 323-345, July.
    15. Alan Gerber & Mitchell Hoffman & John Morgan & Collin Raymond, 2020. "One in a Million: Field Experiments on Perceived Closeness of the Election and Voter Turnout," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 287-325, July.
    16. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2019. "Var det fortsat ”the economy, stupid!” i 2016 og 2018? [Was it still "the economy, stupid!" in 2016 and 2018?]," MPRA Paper 97297, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Kim, Donghyuk, 2023. "Economic spillovers and political payoffs in government competition for firms: Evidence from the Kansas City Border War," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    18. Russell S. Sobel & Gary A. Wagner & Peter T. Calcagno, 2024. "The political economy of state economic development incentives: A case of rent extraction," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 104-151, March.

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