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The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism

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  • Huth, Paul
  • Gelpi, Christopher
  • Bennett, D. Scott

Abstract

Realism has been the dominant paradigm in the study of international conflict. Within this paradigm, two leading alternative approaches have been deterrence theory and structural realism. We test the relative explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches on the escalation of deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984. We derive a set of hypotheses from each model, operationalize them for systematic empirical analysis, and test the hypotheses on 97 cases of great-power deterrence encounters by means of probit analysis. The results are that the hypotheses derived from deterrence theory receive considerable support, whereas none of the hypotheses derived from structural realism are supported.

Suggested Citation

  • Huth, Paul & Gelpi, Christopher & Bennett, D. Scott, 1993. "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 609-623, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:609-623_10
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    Cited by:

    1. T. Clifton Morgan & Glenn Palmer, 2000. "A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(1), pages 11-32, February.
    2. Muhammet A. Bas & Robert J. Schub, 2016. "How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(6), pages 1099-1128, September.
    3. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Nuclear Weapons as Shields," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(3), pages 235-255, July.
    4. Michael J. Ireland & Scott Sigmund Gartner, 2001. "Time to Fight," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 547-568, October.
    5. Serdar Ş. Güner, 2004. "Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict: An Evolutionary Narrative," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 297-312, September.
    6. Kevin A. Clarke, 2005. "The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(4), pages 341-352, September.
    7. Gerald L. Sorokin, 1996. "The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(4), pages 658-677, December.
    8. James Lee Ray, 1998. "R. J. Rummel's Understanding Conflict and War: An Overlooked Classic?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 16(2), pages 125-147, September.
    9. Susumu Suzuki & Volker Krause & J. David Singer, 2002. "The Correlates of War Project: a Bibliographic History of the Scientific Study of War and Peace, 1964-2000," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(2), pages 69-107, September.
    10. Todd S. Sechser, 2011. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 377-401, September.
    11. Giacomo Chiozza & Ajin Choi, 2003. "Guess Who Did What," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(3), pages 251-278, June.
    12. Kevin A. Clarke, 2003. "Nonparametric Model Discrimination in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(1), pages 72-93, February.
    13. Vesna Danilovic, 2001. "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(1), pages 97-125, February.
    14. Brock F. Tessman & Steve Chan, 2004. "Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 131-153, April.
    15. D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam, 2000. "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(5), pages 653-685, October.
    16. Kevin A. Clarke & Curtis S. Signorino, 2010. "Discriminating Methods: Tests for Non‐nested Discrete Choice Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(2), pages 368-388, March.

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