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Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule

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  • Weingast, Barry R.

Abstract

The open rule in the House is a complex set of restrictions, limiting, for example, the number of motions and the order of recognition. By incorporating constraints based on the actual set of rules into a model, I show that legislative outcomes appear more predictable than was previously thought. These rules nearly always allow the proponents of legislation to respond to an opponent's amendment, mitigating the potential damage of the latter. An advantage of the approach is that it provides a new interpretation of the changes in floor activity observed in the postreform period.

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  • Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 795-815, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:03:p:795-815_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Krehbiel, Keith & Diermeier, Daniel, 2001. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," Research Papers 1699, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Woon, Jonathan, 2004. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking," Research Papers 1860, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Wiseman, Alan E., 2013. "A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking," Research Papers 2136, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    5. Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, 2002. "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 93-122, January.
    6. Daniel Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel, 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 123-144, April.

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