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Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age

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  • Powell, Robert

Abstract

In the logic of crisis stability, first-strike advantages may still be destabilizing, although even a successful first strike cannot protect a state from a terribly costly retaliatory second strike. If there is an advantage to striking first and if war seems sufficiently likely, launching a preemptive first strike may seem to be the least of evils. I reconsider the logic of crisis stability by studying games that are completely stable, although there are first-strike advantages. Four general conditions ensure stability. Identifying these conditions refines our understanding of crisis stability by also identifying the potential sources of instability, and this more refined understanding shows that the logic of crisis stability focuses attention too narrowly on first-strike advantages. Stability results from a more subtle interaction of several factors of which a first-strike advantage is only one.

Suggested Citation

  • Powell, Robert, 1989. "Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 61-76, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:01:p:61-76_08
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Harrison Wagner, 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 115-141, April.
    2. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
    3. Jerome Bracken & Martin Shubik, 1993. "Crisis stability games," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 289-303, April.

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