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The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism

Author

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  • Aggarwal, Vinod K.
  • Keohane, Robert O.
  • Yoffie, David B.

Abstract

Recent protectionism by the United States has principally taken the form of negotiated barriers to trade, such as voluntary export restraints. These barriers tend to evolve over time and to display three patterns, which we label institutionalized, temporary, and sporadic protectionism. Cartel theory and studies of the politics of protection suggest that the dynamics of negotiated protectionism will depend on three variables: the barriers to entry into an industry, the size of the domestic industry, and the exit barriers for domestic firms. Low barriers to entry will lead to institutionalized protectionism when the domestic industry is large and exit difficult; temporary protectionism results when the domestic industry is small and exit easy; and sporadic protectionism is likely when barriers to entry are high. Brief studies of U.S. protectionism in textiles and apparel, steel, footwear, televisions, and automobiles illustrate the value of this framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Aggarwal, Vinod K. & Keohane, Robert O. & Yoffie, David B., 1987. "The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 345-366, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:02:p:345-366_19
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    Cited by:

    1. Aria, Dr, 2021. "Technological Innovation and Corporate Entrepreneurship: A Study," MPRA Paper 116344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kenneth A. Froot & David B. Yoffie, 1993. "Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect: Implications for Japan and East Asia," NBER Chapters, in: Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, pages 125-156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rixen, Thomas & Rohlfing, Ingo, 2005. "The political economy of bilateralism and multilateralism: Institutional choice in international trade and taxation," TranState Working Papers 31, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.

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