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Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics

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  • Bendor, Jonathan
  • Moe, Terry M.

Abstract

Most models of agenda control examine dyadic relations—for example, those between a committee and the floor of a legislature. Such relations, however, are always embedded in a larger context, namely, a political environment composed of voters and interest groups. In this paper we model agenda setters (a legislative committee) as decision makers with limited cognitive abilities who adjust over time to their larger political environment. The legislators' policy positions are endogenous, reflecting the relative strengths of voters wielding the district-specific resource of votes and of interest groups wielding the transferable resource of money. The resulting outcomes indicate that neoclassical models of voting and pluralist models of group influence have each told part of the story. When only votes matter, our boundedly rational agents grope toward equilibria close to those of neoclassical models; however, when mobile resources matter as well, the outcomes depart systematically from those of previous models. In particular, interest groups can make themselves worse off by capturing the committee. The results suggest that agenda control is less powerful than conventionally believed and point toward conditions shaping its effectiveness—conditions highlighting the distinctive contributions of pluralist and neoclassical thinking to a broader theory of political institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bendor, Jonathan & Moe, Terry M., 1986. "Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1187-1207, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1187-1207_18
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    Cited by:

    1. Krehbiel, Keith & Diermeier, Daniel, 2001. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," Research Papers 1699, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Christopher Hood, 1991. "Stabilization and Cutbacks," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 37-63, January.
    3. Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, 2002. "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 93-122, January.
    4. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    5. John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Shaheen Naseer, 2019. "Public Spending, Quality of Bureaucracy and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Analysis," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 203-221.

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