IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v80y1986i01p161-184_18.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection

Author

Listed:
  • Goldstein, Judith

Abstract

Domestic support for a liberal commercial policy in the U.S. rests on a commonly accepted set of rules and norms. These rules and norms, best characterized as a defense of free and fair trade, arise from two different traditions. The first originated as a political reaction to high trade barriers preceding the Great Depression. Central decision makers took as a lesson from the depression period that short-term political forces should not determine the level of state intervention into the market. The second, to protect against unfair trade, emanates from a long history of state support for industries that claim foreign producers are pursuing unfair predatory practices. Established in statute before the Depression, these rules did not fundamentally change in the postwar period. Together, these decision rules are used to interpret American trade protectionism.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldstein, Judith, 1986. "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 161-184, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:161-184_18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400182310/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rabinowicz, Ewa, 1992. "Cutting the Agricultural Price Pie: Power or Justice," 1992 Occasional Paper Series No. 6 197732, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Pierre-Olivier Peytral, 2004. "Economie politique de la politique d'ouverture commerciale mixte : interactions entre les groupes sociaux et l'Etat," Post-Print halshs-00104875, HAL.
    3. Michael P. Leidy, 1994. "Trade Policy And Indirect Rent Seeking: A Synthesis Of Recent Work†," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 97-118, July.
    4. William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett, 1989. "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 79-86, October.
    5. Robert E. Cumby & Theodore H. Moran, 1997. "Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process: Antidumping and the "New Issues"," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, pages 161-190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Richard T. Cupitt & Euel Elliott, 1994. "Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting On The Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act Of 1930," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 187-199, November.
    7. Jean-Baptiste Velut, 2023. "Trade Linkages or Disconnects? Labor Rights and Data Privacy in US Digital Trade Policy," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(1), pages 249-260.
    8. Oldřich Krpec & Vladan Hodulák, 2012. "Politická ekonomie zahraniční obchodní politiky - instituce, regulace, sociální a politický kontext [Political Economy of Trade Policy - Institutions, Regulation, Social and Political Context]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(1), pages 20-39.
    9. Michael‐David Mangini, 2023. "Escape from tariffs: The political economies of protection and classification," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 773-805, November.
    10. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2019. "Deglobalization 2.0," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18560.
    11. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2010. "On the Brink of Deglobalization," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14122.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:161-184_18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.