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Potential Responsiveness in the Bureaucracy: Views of Public Utility Regulation

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  • Gormley, William
  • Hoadley, John
  • Williams, Charles

Abstract

To whom is the bureaucracy responsive? A study of public utility regulation in 12 states helps to answer that question. To assess potential responsiveness in the bureaucracy, we examine indicators of attitudinal concurrence. Whether we look at issue priorities or value priorities, public utility commissioners are more responsive to staff members and utility company executives than to governmental consumer advocates. However, bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens varies unexpectedly across stages of the policymaking process. Concurrence between commissioners and citizen activists is relatively high on issue priorities, relatively low on value priorities. Success at the agenda-setting stage does not guarantee success in policy formulation. In practice, agenda responsiveness may be little more than an exercise in symbolic politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Gormley, William & Hoadley, John & Williams, Charles, 1983. "Potential Responsiveness in the Bureaucracy: Views of Public Utility Regulation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 704-717, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:03:p:704-717_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Woo, C.K. & Cheng, Y.S. & Law, A. & Zarnikau, J. & Ho, S.T. & Leung, H.Y., 2015. "Consumer support for a public utilities commission in Hong Kong," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 87-97.
    2. Andrew B. Whitford, 2008. "A Test of the Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(4), pages 445-470, November.

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