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The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory

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  • Schlesinger, Joseph A.

Abstract

Positive or rational choice theorists have tended to suppress under the rubric of “winning” elections a critical distinction in ths goals of political parties (or candidates)—the distinction between the primary goal of office and the goal of the benefits derived from the control of office. The distinction, however, has strategic consequences. Logically, the office-seeker should follow the vote-maximization strategy put forth by Downs, whereas the benefit-seeker should find Riker's minimal winning coalition most congenial. The distinction in goals and strategies also implies divergent ways of organizing political parties. A concern for benefits logically leads to the development of structures designed to insure that the party's officeholders will deliver the desired benefits. The office-seeking goal implies structures which free the party and the office-seeker to maneuver in response to electoral needs. Thus there are two positive theories resting upon two primary political goals. In their differences we find an explanation of the tensions in democratic parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Schlesinger, Joseph A., 1975. "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 840-849, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:03:p:840-849_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Kolios Bill, 2019. "Political Business Cycles in Australia Elections and Party Ideology," Journal of Time Series Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-9, July.
    2. Cecilia Testa, 2004. "Party Polarization and Electoral Accountability," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 130, Econometric Society.
    3. Scott Gehlbach, 2006. "A Formal Model of Exit and Voice," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(4), pages 395-418, November.

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