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The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives

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  • Polsby, Nelson W.
  • Gallaher, Miriam
  • Rundquist, Barry Spencer

Abstract

Popular discussions of the internal management of the U.S. House of Representatives in the present era generally give great weight to the ubiquity and arbitrariness of the seniority system as a significant determinant of outcomes there. Careful attention to the scholarly literature, however, should long since have modified this view. For it appears that except for relatively unimportant matters such as the allocation of office space on Capitol Hill, the criterion of seniority is generally intermingled in House decision-making with a great many other crite ria of choice, and the business of choosing is not automatic, but remains in the hands of persons having some considerable discretion. This, apparently, is the case with respect to such decisions as the allocation of Capitol Hill patronage, the initial assignment of Representatives to committees, the distribution of responsibilities within committees, and the choice of party leaders. The one important area in which seniority seems to play a role of overwhelming significance is in the matter of succession to the chairmanship of committees; this is in turn governed by the custom (not a formal rule) of seniority that guarantees members reappointment to committees at the opening of each new Congress, in rank order of committee service. It is the growth of this method of selecting committee chairmen in the House that is the subject of this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Polsby, Nelson W. & Gallaher, Miriam & Rundquist, Barry Spencer, 1969. "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 787-807, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:03:p:787-807_25
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    Cited by:

    1. Lauren Cohen & Joshua D. Coval & Christopher Malloy, 2010. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?," NBER Working Papers 15839, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lauren Cohen & Joshua Coval & Christopher Malloy, 2011. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1015-1060.
    3. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    4. K. Kanthak, 2004. "Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 391-412, February.

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