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The Seniority System in Congress

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  • Goodwin, George

Abstract

The seniority system ordinarily rates no more than two or three pages in books devoted to Congress. There is likely to be a brief description and a weighing of the arguments, pro and con, followed generally by the conclusion that the system is a poor one; occasionally an author will defend it stoutly. Regardless of the conclusions, the analyses are rarely thorough. This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature on Congress by describing and analyzing various aspects of its seniority system.It is well to remember at the outset that very few human institutions ignore seniority entirely. Champ Clark, in his autobiography, noted that it is observed in all the affairs of life:No sane man would for one moment think of making a graduate from West Point a full general, or one from Annapolis an admiral, or one from any university or college chief of a great newspaper, magazine or business house. A priest or a preacher who has just taken orders is not immediately made a bishop, archbishop or cardinal. In every walk of life “men must tarry at Jericho till their beards are grown.”

Suggested Citation

  • Goodwin, George, 1959. "The Seniority System in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 412-436, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:53:y:1959:i:02:p:412-436_07
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    Cited by:

    1. Lauren Cohen & Joshua D. Coval & Christopher Malloy, 2010. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?," NBER Working Papers 15839, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Yue, Heng & Zhang, Liandong & Zhong, Qinlin, 2022. "The politics of bank opacity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    3. Lauren Cohen & Joshua Coval & Christopher Malloy, 2011. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1015-1060.
    4. Lei Kong, 2020. "Government Spending and Corporate Innovation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(4), pages 1584-1604, April.

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