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The Senate and American Federalism

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  • Riker, William H.

Abstract

At Philadelphia in 1787 the authors of the Constitution invented a new kind of federalism. In previous federal governments, the participating states were no more intimate than permanent allies, and citizens retained a primary loyalty to local governments. The federalism of 1787 achieved a converse effect, however, for it subordinated the member governments and created a nation. Likewise, while the earlier federalisms were notoriously prone to muddles in policy and stalemates in action, the American form turned out to give reasonably effective government, even in the short run. For both its nationalism and its effectiveness, therefore, it found favor with constitution makers elsewhere: in the larger Latin American states, in most of the new nations of the British Commonwealth, in the Germany of Weimar and Bonn, even, on paper at least, in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Probably the clearest demonstration of the prestige and utility of the American invention was the revision (in 1848) of the Swiss Confederation into a federalism patterned after the United States. The cantons thereby abandoned the one remaining survivor of the alliance type of federalism, represented in the middle ages by the Swabian, Rhenish, and Lombard leagues, as well as by the Swiss. And so it happens that about half the earth is presently ruled by federal governments—all of them reminiscent in one way or another of the Philadelphia invention.

Suggested Citation

  • Riker, William H., 1955. "The Senate and American Federalism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 452-469, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:49:y:1955:i:02:p:452-469_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, 2009. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 324-342, April.
    2. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2015. "The Seventeenth Amendment, Senate ideology and the growth of government," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(8), pages 637-640, May.
    3. William Riker, 1987. "The lessons of 1787," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 5-34, September.
    4. John Aldrich & Michael Munger & Jason Reifler, 2014. "Institutions, information, and faction: an experimental test of Riker’s federalism thesis for political parties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 577-588, March.
    5. Nicholas Miller, 2012. "Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-25, January.
    6. Norman Schofield, 2007. "Modelling Politics," ICER Working Papers 33-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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