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The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act

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  • Zeller, Belle

Abstract

Although the need for such action had long been apparent in Washington, it was not until 1946 that a federal statute was enacted for the regulation of general lobbying activities. Prior to that year, Congress had, on a number of occasions, investigated lobbying practices, and as a result had enacted measures which reached a limited number of groups engaged in them. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the congressional act in 1936 affecting the shipping interests, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 were important regulatory measures, but they reached only a few of the groups exerting direct and continuous influence in Washington. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of August 2, 1946, is more general in its coverage; and it has been in force long enough for its effectiveness to be tested.In this article, it is my purpose (1) to supply a brief historical background for the measure referred to; (2) to examine the statute's provisions; (3) to appraise the objections raised to it; (4) to examine the actual administration of the act and point out the difficulties of enforcement, particularly during its first year; and (5) to offer recommendations for strengthening the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Zeller, Belle, 1948. "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 239-271, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:42:y:1948:i:02:p:239-271_05
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio De Francesco & Philipp Trein, 2020. "How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 116-127.

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