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Why So Little Strategic Voting in India?

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  • HEATH, OLIVER
  • ZIEGFELD, ADAM

Abstract

Strategic voting is thought to underlie Duverger’s Law and lead to two-party outcomes in single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems. We examine the extent of strategic voting in the world’s most populous democracy, India, where frequent exceptions to Duverger’s Law have long puzzled political scientists. Using an original voter survey from the 2017 Uttar Pradesh state election, we find extremely low rates of strategic voting. Why? We show that the vast majority of respondents believe that their preferred party is likely to win in their constituency. For most voters, their partisan preferences overwhelmingly predict their beliefs about which party will win. Their election forecasts correspond to objective electoral outcomes only with respect to parties that they like less.

Suggested Citation

  • Heath, Oliver & Ziegfeld, Adam, 2022. "Why So Little Strategic Voting in India?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1523-1529, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:116:y:2022:i:4:p:1523-1529_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Dishil Shrimankar, 2023. "Comparative Assessments of Indian Democracy," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 11(1), pages 134-139, June.

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