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Corruption Information and Vote Share: A Meta-Analysis and Lessons for Experimental Design

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  • INCERTI, TREVOR

Abstract

Debate persists on whether voters hold politicians accountable for corruption. Numerous experiments have examined whether informing voters about corrupt acts of politicians decreases their vote share. Meta-analysis demonstrates that corrupt candidates are punished by zero percentage points across field experiments, but approximately 32 points in survey experiments. I argue this discrepancy arises due to methodological differences. Small effects in field experiments may stem partially from weak treatments and noncompliance, and large effects in survey experiments are likely from social desirability bias and the lower and hypothetical nature of costs. Conjoint experiments introduce hypothetical costly trade-offs, but it may be best to interpret results in terms of realistic sets of characteristics rather than marginal effects of particular characteristics. These results suggest that survey experiments may provide point estimates that are not representative of real-world voting behavior. However, field experimental estimates may also not recover the “true” effects due to design decisions and limitations.

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  • Incerti, Trevor, 2020. "Corruption Information and Vote Share: A Meta-Analysis and Lessons for Experimental Design," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 761-774, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:114:y:2020:i:3:p:761-774_9
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    Cited by:

    1. Izzo, Federica & Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information," MPRA Paper 112559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lundberg, Ian & Brand, Jennie E. & Jeon, Nanum, 2022. "Researcher reasoning meets computational capacity: Machine learning for social science," SocArXiv s5zc8, Center for Open Science.
    3. Jiawei Fu, 2024. "Extract Mechanisms from Heterogeneous Effects: Identification Strategy for Mediation Analysis," Papers 2403.04131, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    4. Rubén Poblete Cazenave, 2021. "Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-049/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Caryn Peiffer & Grant W Walton, 2022. "Getting the (right) message across: How to encourage citizens to report corruption," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 40(5), September.
    6. Engel, Christoph & Zamir, Eyal, 2024. "Is transparency a blessing or a curse? An experimental horse race between accountability and extortionary corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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