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Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets

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  • SCHLEITER, PETRA
  • MORGAN-JONES, EDWARD

Abstract

Some European constitutions give cabinets great discretion to manage their own demise, whereas others limit their choices and insert the head of state into decisions about government termination. In this article, we map the tremendous variation in the constitutional rules that govern cabinet termination and test existing expectations about its effects on a government's survival and mode of termination. In doing so, we use the most extensive government survival data set available to date, the first to include East and West European governments. Our results demonstrate that constitutional constraints on governments and presidential influence on cabinet termination are much more common than has previously been understood and have powerful effects on the hazard profiles of governments. These results alter and improve the discipline's understanding of government termination and durability, and have implications for comparative work in a range of areas, including the survival and performance of democracies, electoral accountability, opportunistic election calling, and political business cycles.

Suggested Citation

  • Schleiter, Petra & Morgan-Jones, Edward, 2009. "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 496-512, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:103:y:2009:i:03:p:496-512_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Becher, Michael, 2018. "Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies," TSE Working Papers 18-945, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Enzo Lenine, 2020. "Modelling Coalitions: From Concept Formation to Tailoring Empirical Explanations," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-12, November.
    3. Kana Inata, 2021. "Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 501-518, June.
    4. Becher, Michael, 2018. "Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies," IAST Working Papers 18-80, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    5. Michael Becher, 2019. "Dissolution power, confidence votes, and policymaking in parliamentary democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(2), pages 183-208, April.

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