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Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace

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  • DE MESQUITA, BRUCE BUENO

Abstract

James Russell and Quincy Wright suggested in the Review in 1933 that the danger of conflict could be diminished by looking within states to discern what contributes to the risk of war. Revolutions in game theory technology and political economy modeling are helping to advance those goals. The combination of non-cooperative game theory as an analytic tool and the assumptions of political economy models about leaders' domestic interests and incentives offer a different explanation of international relations from that suggested by realist theories and other state-centric viewpoints. Together with more macro-level theorizing we gain insights into what makes some polities more prone to international conflict than others. By adding the micro-level, game theoretic investigation of domestic factors to the analytic repertoire we have now supplemented the aspects of received wisdom that are consistent with the record of history with explanations for puzzling facts about conflict that no longer seem anomalous.

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  • De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 2006. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 637-642, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:04:p:637-642_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Paola Conconi & Nicolas Sahuguet & Maurizio Zanardi, 2014. "Democratic Peace And Electoral Accountability," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 997-1028, August.
    2. Mark Harrison & Nikolaus Wolf, 2014. "The Frequency of Wars," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: THE ECONOMICS OF COERCION AND CONFLICT, chapter 5, pages 121-149, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Wockenfuß, Christof, 2009. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz," Discussion Papers 2009-17, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    4. Sebastian Rosato, 2011. "On the Democratic Peace," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2018. "Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 15-26.
    6. Harrison, Mark, 2013. "The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 151, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    7. Jesse C. Johnson & Tiffany D. Barnes, 2011. "Responsibility and the Diversionary Use of Force1," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(5), pages 478-496, November.
    8. Christian Ewerhart, 2021. "A typology of military conflict based on the Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 400, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Wockenfuß Christof, 2010. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz. Ein ordnungspolitischer Beitrag zur internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / Democracy Through Development Competition. An Ordo-Liberal Perspective on the ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 61(1), pages 325-352, January.

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