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Market discipline in Mexican banks: Evidence from the asset side

Author

Listed:
  • Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Chair of World Economics, Laboratory on Socioeconomic Problems in Developing Countries, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

El artículo estudia el efecto de la disciplina de mercado desde el lado de los activos en México, si los prestatarios pagan tasas de interés más altas (mecanismo basado en precio) a bancos de alta calidad, y consecuentemente, si los prestatarios disciplinan sus bancos. Los prestatarios continuamente requieren crédito y prefieren bancos grandes porque su actividad prestamista es confiable (un motivo de refinanciamiento¿solvencia). También los prestatarios prefieren bancos con menores pérdidas crediticias para señalizar su solvencia a otros prestamistas (un motivo de certificación¿señalización). Con una muestra de 37 bancos durante el periodo 2008 a 2012 y un modelo con datos de panel dinámico, se encontró evidencia a favor de dichos motivos a través de un mecanismo basado en precio, es decir, los prestatarios mexicanos están dispuestos a pagar tasas más altas a bancos más grandes, con mayores ratios de capital y reservas para pérdidas crediticias, o con carteras vencidas más bajas. Como resultado, los bancos mexicanos enfrentan disciplina de mercado inducida por los prestatarios, aunque esta disciplina está ausente en bancos de consumo y en los más grandes.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García, 2012. "Market discipline in Mexican banks: Evidence from the asset side," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 35(99), pages 172-181, Diciembre.
  • Handle: RePEc:cud:journl:v:35:y:2012:i:99:p:172-181
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    File URL: https://repositorio.uam.es/bitstream/handle/10486/681968/CE_99_4.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García, 2017. "Market discipline in the Central American bankingsystem," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 62(5), pages 23-24, Diciembre.
    2. Edgar Tovar-García, 2014. "Market discipline: a review of the Mexican deposit market," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 23(1), pages 1-33, December.
    3. Tovar-García, Edgar Demetrio, 2016. "Who can better monitor a bank than another bank? Mechanisms of discipline in the Mexican interbank market ||¿Quién mejor que un banco para monitorear otro banco? Mecanismos de disciplina en el mercado," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 21(1), pages 205-229, June.
    4. Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García, 2016. "Exposure to interbank market and risk-taking by Mexican banks," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 39(111), pages 157-174, Septiembr.
    5. Edgar Demetrio Tovar-García, 2017. "Disciplina de mercado en el sistema bancariocentroamericano," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 62(5), pages 21-22, Diciembre.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market discipline; Certification; Refinancing; Borrower; Banking system; Mexico;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies

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