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The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

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  • Jean-Etienne de Bettignies
  • Thomas W. Ross

Abstract

Governments across Canada and around the world are looking for new ways to deliver public services at lower costs to taxpayers and users. Many have chosen to form public-private partnerships (P3s), involving the private sector to a much greater extent. This choice is often controversial, with the debates routinely driven by ideology more than careful analysis. This paper adds to the limited academic literature on P3s by reviewing the fundamental underlying economics of these relationships to get at their real costs and benefits. The goal is to help us better understand where and how P3s may be an efficient mechanism for the provision of public services.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Thomas W. Ross, 2004. "The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 30(2), pages 135-154, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:135-154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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