IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cpn/umkeip/v8y2012i1p13-26.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decentralization of political structure from the point of view of New Political Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Kalinowski

    (University of Lodz)

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze the decentralization of political structure, with a view to reducing the influence of economical incentives of organized interests on the distribution of public resources. The theoretical deliberations presented in the article are based on the research achievements of the new political economy (NPE). The author argues that the federal jurisdiction where the administration have the power to levy taxes is the closest to nondiscriminatory politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Kalinowski, 2012. "Decentralization of political structure from the point of view of New Political Economy," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(1), pages 13-26, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:13-26
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2012.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2012.001
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.12775/EiP.2012.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oecd, 2011. "Country notes," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 69-213.
    2. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, November.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:cpn:umkeip:2012:v1:p:13-26 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 329-332, September.
    3. Randall G. Holcombe, 2018. "Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Economies, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
    4. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
    5. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
    6. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
    7. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    8. Alexandra Oprea, 2019. "Democracy as a Game of Trust: The Limits of Generality Constraints," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 227-248, December.
    9. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    10. Charles Rowley, 2012. "The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 29-46, July.
    11. Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2020. "Options To The Realm: A Cost Neutral Proposal To Improve Political Incentives," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 515-529, July.
    12. Georg Vanberg & Viktor Vanberg, 2012. "Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 245-252, September.
    13. Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 4(2), pages 169-183, May.
    14. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    15. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    17. Marco Faravelli & Randall Walsh, 2011. "Smooth Politicians And Paternalistic Voters: A Theory Of Large Elections," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000250, David K. Levine.
    18. Eric Kaufmann & Henry Patterson, 2006. "Intra‐Party Support for the Good Friday Agreement in the Ulster Unionist Party," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(3), pages 509-532, October.
    19. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
    20. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 225-246, February.
    21. Sven Banisch & Eckehard Olbrich, 2021. "An Argument Communication Model of Polarization and Ideological Alignment," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 24(1), pages 1-1.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    new political economy; decentralization of political structure;

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:13-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Miroslawa Buczynska (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.wydawnictwoumk.pl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.