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Concentración de mercado en el sector de telecomunicaciones en Venezuela

Author

Listed:
  • MARÍA CRISTINA USECHE
  • YEILING FERNÁNDEZ

Abstract

El objeto de la investigación fue establecer el grado de concentración de las operadoras habilitadasque se desempenan en los segmentos de mercado de telefonía fi ja local y telefonía móvil celular enVenezuela para el período 2004-2007, permitiendo tener una visión de las empresas que tienenpoder de mercado en el sector de telecomunicaciones en el país. Para ello se tomo como referenciael índice de Herfi ndahl-Hirschman (IHH). Se recopiló información gubernamental sobre estesegmento de mercado regulado nacional. Se concluyó que existe un alto nivel de concentraciónen cada rubro, siendo las operadoras habilitadas CANTV y MOVISTAR las que tienen el poder delmercado en las telecomunicaciones a nivel nacional, afectando la competencia y desestimulando aotras empresas a desempenarse en el ámbito nacional.

Suggested Citation

  • María Cristina Useche & Yeiling Fernández, 2008. "Concentración de mercado en el sector de telecomunicaciones en Venezuela," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000180:010404
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Germán Coloma, 2002. "Apuntes de organización industrial (parte 1)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 221, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. Germán Coloma, 2002. "Apuntes de organización industrial (parte 2)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 222, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Richard G. Harris & Elmer G. Wiens, 1980. "Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of Industry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 125-132, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    concentración; poder del mercado; competencia; operadoras habilitadas en telecomunicaciones.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L - Industrial Organization

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