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Determinantes de la propensión a comportamientos corruptos: un análisis experimental con mecanismo de castigo

Author

Listed:
  • Milton Fabián Castano-Munoz
  • José Santiago Arroyo-Mina
  • Juan Fernando Álvarez-Correa
  • Hollman Jurado-Barco

Abstract

En esta investigación se buscó identificar algunos de los determinantes que explican la propensión de los individuos a comportamientos corruptos, con base en la toma de decisiones que involucran beneficios económicos. Para ello, se aplicó un experimento económico en una muestra de la población de una universidad de la ciudad de Cali, Colombia. El diseno experimental responde a los elementos propios de un mecanismo de subasta a sobre cerrado que involucra una oferta de soborno. A partir de análisis descriptivos y un modelo logístico de promedio poblacional para datos de panel no lineales, se evidenció que el nivel educativo y socioeconómico se asocian fuertemente con el comportamiento corrupto. Así mismo, se encuentra que la amenaza de penalización reduce de manera drástica la corrupción a un costo social insignificante.

Suggested Citation

  • Milton Fabián Castano-Munoz & José Santiago Arroyo-Mina & Juan Fernando Álvarez-Correa & Hollman Jurado-Barco, 2021. "Determinantes de la propensión a comportamientos corruptos: un análisis experimental con mecanismo de castigo," Estudios Gerenciales, Universidad Icesi, vol. 37(161), pages 579-589, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000129:019691
    DOI: 10.18046/j.estger.2021.161.4335
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    soborno; corrupción; economía experimental; juegos no cooperativos; datos panel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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