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Price dispersion in a directed search model

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  • Ce Huang

Abstract

This paper investigates a directed search model in which some buyers are uninformed about prices. We find that sellers' strategies are given by discrete distributions in any symmetric pricing equilibrium. When the proportion of uninformed buyers is sufficiently high, the unique symmetric pricing equilibrium involves a countably infinite number of atoms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ce Huang, 2016. "Price dispersion in a directed search model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1208-1223, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:3:p:1208-1223
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12230
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    Cited by:

    1. Kircher, Philipp & Wright, Randall & Julien, Benoit & Guerrieri, Veronica, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," CEPR Discussion Papers 12315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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