IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v39y2006i3p1005-1022.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Informational externalities with lump-sum sampling

Author

Listed:
  • Carole Haritchabalet
  • Régis Renault

Abstract

We consider a game of strategic experimentation where agents are restricted to an all-or-nothing sampling strategy. The strategic interaction between agents due to informational externalities is affected by the sizes of the experimentation samples and the sensitivity of information to changes in sample sizes. There is experimentation only if the overall sample is large enough. Equilibrium may involve optimal, insufficient or excessive experimentation relative to a second-best welfare benchmark. This unusual over-experimentation result is associated not necessarily with large samples but with a low elasticity of the value of information with respect to the sample size.

Suggested Citation

  • Carole Haritchabalet & Régis Renault, 2006. "Informational externalities with lump-sum sampling," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 1005-1022, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:3:p:1005-1022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:3:p:1005-1022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.