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Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking

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  • Jean-Luc Migue
  • Richard Marceau

Abstract

In assessing the impact of pollution taxes and subsidies against the reference grid of a Coasean system of property rights assignment, the authors show that both policy tools give rise to rent seeking and nonoptimal results. In contrast to the conventional analysis of environment policy, congestion, entry by subsidized polluters, political competition for a share of the general public fund, and migration to regions endowed in environmental resources are seen as sources of rent dissipation to be subtracted from the welfare gain of pollution-control policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Luc Migue & Richard Marceau, 1993. "Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 355-365, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:2:p:355-65
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Zhongbing & Qin, Quande & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2020. "Government intervention in energy conservation: Justification and warning," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Atashbar, Tohid, 2012. "Illusion therapy: How to impose an economic shock without social pain," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 99-111.
    3. Chen, Yenming J. & Chen, Tsung-Hui, 2019. "Fair sharing and eco-efficiency in green responsibility and green marketing policy," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 232-245.
    4. Beard, Rodney, 2007. "Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists," MPRA Paper 5351, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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