IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v26y1993i1p134-49.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Analysis of Common Sales Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Anming Zhang

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when sellers are better informed about the products than potential buyers. The author shows that an exclusive channel can create a cost, owing to the inability of exclusive sellers to commit themselves to sales impartiality. Independent noncooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment to sales impartiality. The author demonstrates that common sales agency can arise as an equilibrium outcome in the absen ce of cost savings, marketing advantages, or the Bernheim-Whinston collusion effect. The analysis shows that common agency of this type can be welfare improving.

Suggested Citation

  • Anming Zhang, 1993. "An Analysis of Common Sales Agents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 134-149, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:1:p:134-49
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199302%2926%3A1%3C134%3AAAOCSA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    2. Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, 1999. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 719-749, December.
    3. Matthias Hunold & Johannes Muthers, 2011. "Resale Price Maintenance: Hurting Competitors, Consumers and Yourself," Working Papers 100, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:1:p:134-49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.