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Emergence of a New Regulation: Informational Disclosure Modalities in the Hedge Fund Opacity World

Author

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  • Sandra Rigot
  • Yamina Tadjeddine

Abstract

The 2007-2008 crisis has highlighted the tensions related to lack of transparency and asymmetrical information in the hedge fund industry. Damage can be estimated at a micro level by a misallocation induced by a double (ex ante and ex post) asymmetry and at a macro level by increasing financial and banking instability. One way to resolve market failures is to require hedge funds to disclose more information, but information can be revealed in different ways. We propose an original typology of disclosure modalities by distinguishing the aim of informational disclosure (macro/ micro allocation) and the modality (by free bargaining, by a standardized contract, by an obligation toward the regulatory authorities, by publicity). We use Kohonen maps to classify issued proposals and reports. We define two typologies: one of informational disclosure modalities and of financial regulation policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Rigot & Yamina Tadjeddine, 2010. "Emergence of a New Regulation: Informational Disclosure Modalities in the Hedge Fund Opacity World," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 123, pages 161-195.
    • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepiie:2010-q3-123-7
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    Cited by:

    1. V. Bouvatier & S. Rigot, 2013. "Pension funds' allocations to hedge funds: an empirical analysis of US and Canadian defined benefit plans," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(26), pages 3701-3710, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informational asymmetry; Disclosure; Financial regulation; Hedge funds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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