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Allocation efficace d’un cout global d’environnement entre pays : permis negociables VS taxes ou permis negociables ET taxes ?

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Bernard
  • Marc Vielle

Abstract

Une evaluation avec un modele mondial d’equilibre general. Dans un monde d’efficacite paretienne (ou de premier rang), l’internalisation des externalites telles que la pollution peut etre realisee par des taxes ou par des marches de permis, aussi bien dans un pays qu’a l’echelle internationale. La taxe environnementale est alors egale au cout social marginal de reduction des emissions de pollution, c’est-a-dire a la perte economique entrainee par une variation unitaire des emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Bernard & Marc Vielle, 2000. "Allocation efficace d’un cout global d’environnement entre pays : permis negociables VS taxes ou permis negociables ET taxes ?," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 82, pages 103-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepiei:2000-2td
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    File URL: http://www.cepii.fr/IE/ei.asp?issue=82
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy

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