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Private Investoren für öffentliche Projekte: Schattenhaushalt oder Notwendigkeit?

Author

Listed:
  • Alfons J. Weichenrieder
  • Markus Kerber
  • Alfons Weichenrieder

Abstract

Führt eine private Finanzierung von Infrastrukturprojekten zu größerer Wirtschaftlichkeit, oder ist dies nur eine Umgehung der Schuldenbremse? Für Alfons Weichenrieder, Universität Frankfurt, liegt der Verdacht nahe – so ökonomisch sinnvoll im Einzelfall der Einsatz eines Public Private Partnerships (PPP) sein mag –, dass in vielen Fällen nicht die optimale Vertragsgestaltung, sondern die Umgehung von öffentlichen Verschuldungsgrenzen im Vordergrund steht. Bei der Wahl von PPP-Instrumenten sollte die Effizienz der Bereitstellung bei öffentlicher Infrastruktur und Dienstleistungen im Vordergrund stehen, nicht die Umgehung von Budgetregeln und die versteckte Lastverschiebung in die Zukunft. Mehr Transparenz könnte durch die Ergänzung der Kameralistik durch doppelte Buchführung und geeignete Rückstellungen für aus PPPs eingegangene Zukunftsverpflichtungen hergestellt werden. Ein anderes Instrument liege in der Anpassung von Budgetregeln. Die europäische Konvention, nach der die Maastricht-Relevanz von PPPs davon abhänge, ob das wirtschaftliche Risiko beim privaten Partner liege, sei wenig einleuchtend. Eine zukünftige Belastung des staatlichen Haushalts nur deshalb zu ignorieren, weil sie mit Sicherheit auftrete, sei wenig überzeugend. Aber auch in der deutschen Schuldenbremse spreche vieles dafür, Rückstellungen für zukünftige Zahlungsverpflichtungen aus PPP-Verträgen auf das Kontrollkonto anzurechnen und ähnliche Regelungen in den Bundesländern zu treffen. Nach Ansicht von Markus Kerber, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, ist der momentan einzig mögliche Weg, für Infrastrukturinvestitionen zeitnah auch institutionelles Kapital zu aktivieren, öffentlich-private Partnerschaften (ÖPP). Sie ermöglichen es, seiner Meinung nach, aufgrund des Streckungseffekts der Verbindlichkeiten, mehr Investitionen anzustoßen, als im Rahmen konventioneller Projekte möglich wäre. Dabei handele sich nicht um eine Verlagerung von Schulden auf künftige Generationen. Ebenso gäbe es keine Anhaltspunkte, dass es sich bei ÖPP um Schattenhaushalte handele. ÖPP helfe dabei, die zwei Ziele der Bundesregierung miteinander zu verbinden: »Schwarze Null« und »Mehr Investitionen in die Infrastruktur«.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Markus Kerber & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2014. "Private Investoren für öffentliche Projekte: Schattenhaushalt oder Notwendigkeit?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(22), pages 03-08, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:67:y:2014:i:22:p:03-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2009. "A Note on Local Public Investment and Debt Limitation in a Federation," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 3-8, Spring.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Öffentliche Ausgaben; Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft; Infrastrukturfinanzierung; Makroökonomischer Einfluss; Haushaltskonsolidierung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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