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Bankenregulierung am Scheideweg

Author

Listed:
  • Stephan Paul
  • Stefan Stein

Abstract

In der Frage der Bankenregulierung wird derzeit über das richtige Konzept diskutiert. Soll der mit Basel II verfolgte Ansatz der am Risiko der jeweiligen Bank orientierten Eigenkapitalunterlegung ausgebaut oder eine nicht-risikoorientierte Kennziffer wie die Leverage Ratio (bilanzielles Eigenkapital zu Geschäftsvolumen) die zentrale Kennzahl für die Bankenaufsicht sein? Stephan Paul, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, und Stefan Stein, Hochschule BiTS Business and Information Technology School in Iserlohn, diskutieren in diesem Beitrag, welcher Art der Regulierung die richtige ist.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan Paul & Stefan Stein, 2013. "Bankenregulierung am Scheideweg," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(16), pages 25-30, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:66:y:2013:i:16:p:25-30
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew G. Haldane & Vasileios Madouros, 2012. "The dog and the frisbee," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 109-159.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankrisiko; Basler Akkord; Bankenliquidität; Bankenaufsicht; Bankenkrise; Deutschland; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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