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Drohende Kreditklemme : sollten die Basel-II-Regeln überholt oder zeitweise ausgesetzt werden?

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Hellwig
  • Martin Faust
  • Hans-Peter Burghof
  • Mario Ohoven
  • Christoph Schalast

Abstract

Im Gefolge der Finanzkrise werden Forderungen nach einer Reform oder sogar einer zeitlichen Aussetzung von Basel II laut. Kritisiert wird vor allem die systemimmanente Prozyklizität. Ist dieser Mechanismus mitverantwortlich für die bestehende oder vermeintliche Kreditklemme? Martin Hellwig vermisst bei dem derzeit praktizierten System der Eigenkapitalregulierung von Banken die konzeptionelle Grundlage. Die intendierte Wirkungsweise sei nie dargelegt worden. Tatsächlich habe die Eigenkapitalregulierung in der Krise als »Brandbeschleuniger und nicht als Feuerlöscher« gewirkt und sollte »grundlegend umgebaut oder abmontiert« werden. Für Martin Faust sind Basel I und Basel II nicht die alleinige Ursache für eine Kreditklemme, sie haben jedoch die Entwicklung, die dazu geführt hat, begünstigt. Die Antwort auf die aktuelle Krise solle daher nicht die Aufweichung der Basel-II-Regeln, z.B. bei der Akzeptanz von Eigenkapitalbestandteilen, sein, sondern eine grundlegende Reform. Auch Hans-Peter Burghof sieht viele Gründe, die Baseler Regeln zu überarbeiten. Denn diese Regeln seien »ein höchst unvollkommener Kompromiss zwischen dem aus Sicht der Theorie Erstrebenswerten und dem in der Praxis Machbaren«. Aussetzen solle man die Baseler Normen aber nicht, da eine unzureichende Eigenkapitalregulierung gefährlich sei und Banken ohne ausreichende Eigenkapitalausstattung ein Systemrisiko darstellen. Mario Ohoven führt die Kreditklemme auf ein Regulierungsversagen zurück. Basel II verzerre die Kreditmärkte, weil es Kredite und Verbriefungen ungleich behandle. Das Regelwerk müsse durch Basel III ersetzt werden, damit sich die Kreditversorgung des Mittelstands nicht weiter verschlechtere. Christoph Schalast findet derzeit kaum überzeugende Argumente für ein Aussetzen von Basel II. Vielmehr könnte eine solche Maßnahme das gerade wieder entstehende Vertrauen in die und in der Finanzindustrie erschüttern.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig & Martin Faust & Hans-Peter Burghof & Mario Ohoven & Christoph Schalast, 2009. "Drohende Kreditklemme : sollten die Basel-II-Regeln überholt oder zeitweise ausgesetzt werden?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 62(15), pages 3-18, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:62:y:2009:i:15:p:3-18
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    1. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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