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Föderalismuskommission II: Neue Schuldenregelung für Bund und Länder und Altschuldenhilfe - wie sollten die Finanzbeziehungen von Bund und Ländern neu geordnet werden?

Author

Listed:
  • Jörg-Uwe Hahn
  • Kai A. Konrad
  • Eckhard Janeba
  • Max Groneck
  • Robert C. Plachta

Abstract

Um die öffentliche Verschuldung in Deutschland tatsächlich zurückzuführen, ist eine grundsätzliche Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen nötig. Nach Meinung von Jörg-Uwe Hahn, FDP Hessen und Mitglied der Föderalismuskommission II, bedarf es, neben eines möglichst strikten Neuverschuldungsverbots, einer Stärkung der Finanzautonomie insbesondere der Bundesländer, aber auch von Bund und Gemeinden. Notwendig sei es, im Sinne einer echten Steuerautonomie den Ländern dort, wo ihnen der Steuerertrag zusteht, auch die Gesetzgebungskompetenz einzuräumen. Kai A. Konrad, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung und Freie Universität Berlin, sieht weniger beim Bund, sondern vor allem bei den Ländern das zentrale Problem. Sie könnten in der extremen Haushaltsnotlage auf eine Rettung durch die Bund-Länder-Gemeinschaft hoffen. Die Reform werde anscheinend von vielen Akteuren "als willkommene Chance gesehen, damit Umverteilungsgewinne zu Lasten anderer Gebietskörperschaften zu erzielen". Eckhard Janeba, Universität Mannheim und Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, unterstreicht, dass konstitutionelle Regeln zur Begrenzung von Verschuldung ein wichtiges Instrument seien, um eine langfristig solide Finanzpolitik zu erreichen, sieht aber darin die Gefahr, "dass die Entscheidung über den Haushalt und damit die Verschuldung zu einem Expertenproblem wird, von der die politische Öffentlichkeit abgekoppelt ist. Diesem sollte entgegengewirkt werden. Der Vorschlag des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim BMWI geht in die richtige Richtung, indem er auf eine Identifikation der Verschuldungsursachen verzichtet und durch eine qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidung den Haushaltsbeschluss in den politischen Mittelpunkt zurückführt." Max Groneck und Robert C. Plachta, Universität zu Köln, stellen ein Reformkonzept vor.

Suggested Citation

  • Jörg-Uwe Hahn & Kai A. Konrad & Eckhard Janeba & Max Groneck & Robert C. Plachta, 2008. "Föderalismuskommission II: Neue Schuldenregelung für Bund und Länder und Altschuldenhilfe - wie sollten die Finanzbeziehungen von Bund und Ländern neu geordnet werden?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 61(09), pages 03-14, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:61:y:2008:i:09:p:03-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Föderalismus; Reform; Öffentliche Schulden; Deutschland;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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