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Does Perceived Governmental Efficiency In Managing Tax Money Drive Compliance? Evidence From A Tax Game

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Listed:
  • BATRANCEA LARISSA-MARGARETA

    („BABEŞ-BOLYAI” UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA)

  • NICHITA RAMONA-ANCA

    („BABEŞ-BOLYAI” UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA)

  • BĂTRÂNCEA IOAN

    („BABEŞ-BOLYAI” UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA)

Abstract

Tax compliance, i.e. citizens’ disposition to pay taxes either voluntary or enforced, is an extremely important topic at any moment, but mostly when governments have to finance public goods with few tax money. In the light of these realities, governments have to find ways of providing public goods by boosting tax compliance. In order to achieve this goal, various factors influencing compliance have to be considered among which the efficiency of the government in managing tax money. In an experimental tax game preceded by a self-reported tax compliance attitudes questionnaire, we show that the information concerning government’s efficiency significantly influences tax payments. Moreover, tax compliance attitudes act as a mediator between the independent variable scenario (i.e., information about government efficiency) and the dependent variable tax payments.

Suggested Citation

  • Batrancea Larissa-Margareta & Nichita Ramona-Anca & Bătrâncea Ioan, 2012. "Does Perceived Governmental Efficiency In Managing Tax Money Drive Compliance? Evidence From A Tax Game," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 3, pages 34-44, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbu:jrnlec:y:2012:v:3:p:34-44
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    References listed on IDEAS

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